

FORCING DOCTRINE TO MATCH REALITY: BRIDGING THE FOREIGN
MILITARY TRAINING DOCTRINE GAP WITHIN THE
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Bachelor of Professional Studies, University of New England, 2004

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2007

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| REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE | | | | Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 | |
|---|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|---|
| Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. | | | | | |
| 1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 14-12-2007 | | 2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis | | 3. DATES COVERED (From - To) FEB 2007 - DEC 2007 | |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE FORCING DOCTRINE TO MATCH REALITY - BRIDGING THE FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING DOCTRINE GAP WITHIN THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE. | | | | 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5b. GRANT NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER | |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) Ross, Jason D., Major | | | | 5d. PROJECT NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5e. TASK NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER | |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD 100 Stimson Ave. Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301 | | | | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER | |
| 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | | | | 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) | |
| | | | | 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) | |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. | | | | | |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES | | | | | |
| 14. ABSTRACT Australian military forces across a broad spectrum of military rank and branch are serving a crucial operational requisite for enduring stability in Iraq through the training of Iraqi security forces. Whilst it behoves the Special Operations community to maintain excellence in what has become a traditional role, conventional single services and branches must similarly embrace the role and be prepared to conduct the full spectrum of military operations. A great deal can be learned from historical case studies of foreign military training models. Similarly, contemporary models are equally valuable in establishing 'best practices' for what is a scantily documented and often misinterpreted capability. Australian military forces possess a proud tradition of training foreign militaries both historically and contemporarily. However, has repeatedly failed to produce timely formal doctrine for subsequent use and professional development. Australia has identified an enduring requirement to provide foreign military training and advisory assistance within its strategic sphere of influence. Conventional and unconventional Australian military forces currently train foreign security forces in a number of countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor, and the Solomons. The necessity for doctrine has been established, but not developed. Conducting a military attack under high intensity, asymmetric, and complex conditions without the foundation of validated doctrine is both nonsensical to consider and destined for failure. Assuming this premise as true, it is fair to state that the Australian Defence Force has an immediate requirement to develop foreign military training doctrine and cease the practice of adopting ad hoc procedures. What is now urgently needed is a research program aimed at establishing the principles of foreign military training doctrine best suiting the needs of the Australian Defence Force. | | | | | |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS training, foreign military, security force assistance, special operations, Australian doctrine | | | | | |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: | | | 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU | 18. NUMBER OF PAGES 86 | 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON |
| a. REPORT Unclassified | b. ABSTRACT Unclassified | c. THIS PAGE Unclassified | | | 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) |

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Jason D. Ross

Thesis Title: Forcing doctrine to match reality: Bridging the foreign military training doctrine gap within the Australian Defence Force.

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ABSTRACT

FORCING DOCTRINE TO MATCH REALITY - BRIDGING THE FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING DOCTRINE GAP WITHIN THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE by MAJ Jason. D. Ross., Australian Regular Army, 86 pages.

Australian military forces across a broad spectrum of military rank and branch are serving a crucial operational requisite for enduring stability in Iraq through the training of Iraqi security forces. There most certainly exist numerous circumstances suited to Special Operations Forces assuming the lead of providing Foreign Military Training; however, to assume sole responsibility only serves to impede the development of the capability in the rest of the Australian Defence Force. Whilst it behooves the Special Operations community to maintain excellence in what has become a traditional role, conventional single services and branches must similarly embrace the role and be prepared to conduct the full spectrum of military operations.

A great deal can be learned from historical case studies of foreign military training models. Similarly, contemporary models are equally valuable in establishing 'best practices' for what is a scantily documented and often misinterpreted capability. Australian military forces possess a proud tradition of training foreign militaries both historically and contemporarily. However, they have repeatedly failed to produce timely formal doctrine for subsequent use and professional development.

Australia has identified an enduring requirement to provide foreign military training and advisory assistance within its strategic sphere of influence. Conventional and unconventional Australian military forces currently train foreign security forces in a number of countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor, and the Solomons. The necessity for doctrine has been established, but not developed.

Conducting a military attack under high intensity, asymmetric, and complex conditions without the foundation of validated doctrine is both nonsensical to consider and destined for failure. Assuming this premise as true, it is fair to state that the Australian Defence Force has an immediate requirement to develop foreign military training doctrine and cease the practice of adopting ad hoc procedures. What is now urgently needed is a research program aimed at establishing the principles of foreign military training doctrine best suiting the needs of the Australian Defence Force.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to thank my wife Nicole who deserves the greatest acknowledgement as a full partner and enabler to all of my endeavours. Soldiers receive medals and commendations for their service. The commitment and devotion offered by soldiers wives is often overlooked and under recognised. My wife and the mother of our children is my unsung hero. Additionally to my children Harrison, Isabella and William, who constantly provide me with love, laughter and happiness. Truly our three greatest achievements.

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ACRONYMS

| | |
|----------|--|
| 4C Model | Competent, Capable, Committed, and Confident |
| ABCA | America, British, Canada and Australia |
| AATTV | Australian Army Training Team Vietnam |
| AATTI | Australian Army Training Team Iraq |
| ADF | Australian Defense Force |
| ADFWC | Australian Defense Force Warfare Centre |
| BTT1 | Battalion Training Team One |
| CCP | Combined Campaign Plans |
| CGS | Chief of the General Staff |
| CORDS | Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support |
| COE | Contemporary Operational Environment |
| COIN | Counter Insurgency Operations |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration |
| FID | Foreign Internal Defense |
| FMT | Foreign Military Training |
| GWOT | Global War on Terrorism |
| HN | Host Nation |
| IA | Iraqi Army |
| ISF | Iraqi Security Forces |
| JCISFA | Joint Centre for International Security Force Assistance |
| JCS | Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| MAAG | Military Assistance and Advisory Group |
| MACV | Military Assistance Command Vietnam |

| | |
|-------|--------------------------------------|
| MATA | Military Assistance Training Advisor |
| MOD | Ministry of Defense |
| MOE | Measure of Effectiveness |
| MOI | Ministry of Interior |
| OIF | Operation Iraqi Freedom |
| PF | Popular Force |
| RF | Regional Force |
| RVN | Republic of Vietnam |
| RVNAF | Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces |
| SF | Security Forces |
| SOF | Special Operations Forces |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| TTP | Tactics, Techniques and Procedures |
| VC | Viet Cong |
| WMD | Weapons of Mass Destruction |

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Military doctrine is military, and particularly tactical philosophy; doctrine creates certainty, which is the soul of every action.

General A.A. Svechin. *The Foundation of Military Doctrine* 1920.

The principal theme of this thesis is to force Australian foreign military training doctrine to match reality and to bridge an identified gap existing within the Australian Defence Force (ADF) doctrinal hierarchy. The doctrinal ‘gap’ exists between a concept of operational intent and the provision of supporting doctrine. This thesis aims to highlight the Australian FMT doctrinal ‘gap’ and develop doctrine to match the reality of proposed operational intent. This paper will examine the historical Vietnam and the contemporary Iraq advisory efforts, together with a review of contemporary US Foreign Military Training (FMT) related doctrine in an effort to provide recommendations for closing the Australian FMT doctrine gap. Finally, this thesis will provide recommendations for the development and content regarding an Australian FMT doctrinal hierarchy.

Across a broad spectrum of military rank and branches, ADF forces are serving a crucial operational requisite for realizing stability in Iraq and Afghanistan through the training of Host Nation (HN) security forces. There almost certainly exist numerous circumstances suited to Special Forces assuming the lead of providing training and advisory assistance to foreign security forces; however, to assume away sole responsibility serves only to impede the development of the capability. Whilst it behoves the Special Operations community to maintain excellence in what has become one of its

traditional roles, conventional single services and corps must similarly embrace the role and be prepared to conduct the full spectrum of military operations.

The November 2006 Australian Army operational concept ‘Adaptive Campaigning’ makes reference to the fact that the Australian Army currently conducts foreign military training, and must be prepared to continue to do so in the future.¹ There is additional reference made under the ‘Indigenous Capacity Building’ line of operation within the Adaptive Campaigning concept; however, there is a gap between the ADF commitment to FMT in capability papers and the establishment of associated formal doctrine. The America, British, Canada and Australia (ABCA) Stability Operations Working Group under the auspices of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) identified this gap in 2006.² The same working group referred the doctrinal deficiency to the Australian Defense Force Warfare Centre (ADFWC) as an area requiring joint doctrinal attention. Currently, work has not commenced at ADFWC to bridge this doctrinal gap.³

“Doctrine development is a dynamic, iterative process that is informed by both history and the current activities of the Australian Defence Force.”⁴ Indeed, several Australian historical and contemporary military operations have provided training and advisory assistance to foreign militaries and research of these operations as case studies is useful in forming the basis for development of ADF foreign military training doctrine. Additionally, the capture of lessons learned from Australian and other nations’ foreign

¹ Australian Army, Australian Defense Force, *Adaptive Campaigning Concept Paper*, 2006, p. 14.

² Personal correspondence between author and LTC Stuart Kenny, Staff Officer One, Doctrine Wing, Australian Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal, 14 March 2007

³ Ibid

⁴ Australian Defence Force, *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, 2002, p. 1-1.

military training models enables the identification of common threads for both successful training techniques and systemic training pitfalls. Finally, analysis into the potential value of utilizing existing US Foreign Internal Defense (FID) doctrine is useful in developing suitable ADF foreign military training doctrine.

For example, Australia announced its intent to contribute militarily to the training of indigenous forces in Vietnam in May 1962.⁵ The initial commitment was a group of military instructors formally titled the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) and informally referred to as ‘the team.’⁶ The Australian Army war diaries for AATTV provide an invaluable insight to the history and operational facts concerning Australia’s commitment to the Vietnam advisory effort. The AATTV role was to assist in the training of the ground forces of South Vietnam and initially formed under command of the US Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG). The commitment of the Australian training team marked the initial major foreign military training operation undertaken by Australia. AATTV deployed as advisors operating in small teams across a wide spectrum of military posts throughout South Vietnam.

Review of AATT-V Commanders’ Diaries indicates that an informational gap existed concerning exact operational roles for the team and the proposed training methods the team would adopt. Additionally, doctrine did not exist as a basis for the establishment of training team tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The inaugural AATT-V team prepared using limited informational sources and was further constrained to the Australian training environment to establish methods of operation. They did not have

⁵ Australian Army war diaries, South East Asian conflicts Sub-class ½, *Australian Army Training Team Vietnam AWM95, 1/2/3*, 1 - 31 August 1962, Narrative, Annexes, p. A-3

⁶ Bruce Davies and Gary McKay, *The Men Who Persevered*, Allen and Unwin, 2005, p.

previous Australian foreign military training models to use as a basis for establishing procedures.⁷

Upon commencement of training operations, the team rapidly adapted and established methods of operation as a result of learning from mistakes and successes experienced through trial and error in their initial efforts. Disappointingly, such procedures for training operations were not well-captured post conflict in Vietnam and did not result in the construction of foreign military training doctrine. The capture of lessons learned and doctrine has historically proven itself the trend following cessation of hostilities. Modern day research has archived the collection of AATTV operating procedures. However, this collection is not readily available as a planning tool for contemporary ADF foreign military training operations, nor has it evolved into formal or endorsed doctrine.

The ADF has continued to train and advise foreign militaries post Vietnam. Of significance regarding duration, scale, and relevance as a contemporary foreign military training case study is the Australian Army Training Team Iraq (AATTI). The primary role of the AATTI is to train and mentor newly established Iraqi military forces at the Brigade and Battalion level. Australian and coalition military advisors throughout Iraq face similar challenges, training roles, and operational responsibilities to those undertaken by the Vietnam training teams. Similarly, Iraq training teams are not afforded doctrine as the basis for developing common operational procedures. The underlying question and subsequent agenda of this thesis is asking the question why the ADF has

⁷ Ibid

failed to develop the requisite doctrine for foreign military advisors, and not taken the opportunity to learn from the lessons of MAAG and AATT-V.

The Iraq training teams enable future operations by studying cultural and Iraqi military sources prior to establishing themselves within theatre. Rotational training teams prepare using lessons learned by teams with previous in-theatre experience. As part of pre-mission rehearsal exercises, Commanders established the practice of making experienced advisors available as instructors as the method of preparing officers and soldiers for foreign advisory roles. There is evidence that the TTP used by the Iraqi advisors is a direct derivation of the lessons learned by Vietnam advisors. Although the geographical and cultural operational environment in Iraq differs greatly from that of Vietnam, the challenges and successes remain primarily the same concerning the training of indigenous military forces. The similarities between the Vietnam and Iraq training teams disappointingly continue with the failure to capitalize upon contemporary foreign military training procedures and the failure to establish formally endorsed doctrine.

The training teams in both Vietnam and Iraq faced similar challenges establishing operational and training procedures, and had a similar lack of doctrine to formulate those operational procedures. It is predictable that the research of the two foreign military training models as case studies will present recommendations for the establishment of contemporary ADF doctrine. A limitation of the proposed research, however, is the deficiency of Australian source material capturing lessons learned and adopted procedures of AATTV and AATTI. In mitigating this limitation, US source materials from both theaters concerning foreign military training are useful in providing depth to

proposed doctrinal development recommendations given the similarities experienced by Australian and US trainers.

Foreign military training case studies will not entirely satisfy the doctrinal development requirements. Contemporary doctrine used by other nations' defense forces will assist in providing the depth of requisite doctrinal information. As an example, the US military has adopted the FID model as a method of contributing to stability operations via the training of foreign militaries. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines FID as the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

The purpose of conducting a program of FID is to provide the opportunity to establish legitimate self-governance upon achieving relative security. This doctrinal model has recognizable implementation value for the development of ADF doctrine. A link exists for FID throughout joint and single service US doctrine and allows for extensive application. It additionally serves the role of developing core foreign military training skills while allowing adaptation to geographic-specific requirements, such as cultural and regional aspects. It facilitates the doctrinal framework as a basis for establishing proven methods of operation. It further allows the adaptation of evolutionary procedures based upon changing operational environments, threats, or requisite capabilities. US foreign military training doctrine developed from historical and contemporary training models. Similar to the Australian experience, the US military failed to formalize comprehensive foreign military training doctrine after the Vietnam

War. Lessons learned since have resulted in the development of FID doctrine as a useful tool for the US foreign military trainer and it likewise useful in the development of foreign military training doctrine for the ADF.

The preliminary needs analysis performed by the ABCA working group identified a requirement to develop foreign military training doctrine for the ADF. Australia has identified an enduring requirement to provide training and advisory assistance within its strategic sphere of influence. Upon that premise, the development of foreign military training doctrine for the ADF is essential. This thesis will therefore explore the critical question: How should the ADF joint doctrine agency, ADFWC, address the doctrinal gap regarding foreign military training? The research of historical and contemporary foreign military training case studies, in addition to the investigation of other nations' contemporary subject doctrine, provides the catalyst for addressing the thesis critical question. It additionally satisfies the thesis secondary and tertiary questions of how the lessons learned from Australian and US FMT models and contemporary US doctrine can contribute to developing ADF FMT doctrine. Endorsed doctrine within the ADF refers to the fact that the Australian Army currently trains foreign militaries. It fails, however, to establish a doctrinal link to foreign military training. The aim of this thesis is to bridge that gap and provide recommendations for the development of ADF foreign military training doctrine.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The best form of welfare for the troops is first-class training, for this saves unnecessary casualties.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel⁸

The Joint Centre for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has developed a foreign military training (FMT) validation model for use by both foreign military training planners and advisory teams engaged in realizing end state goals for HN security forces. The JCISFA 4C model focuses upon achieving that aim by establishing principles for developing competent, capable, committed, and confident HN security forces. The validation model, informally known as the 4C, will serve as the research analysis model for the selected historical and contemporary foreign military training case studies. Foreign military training is aimed at augmenting internal stability and security through the provision of advisory and training assistance to host nation security forces.⁹

The initial aim of foreign military training under the 4C model is to develop *competent* Host Nation security forces. Foreign military training programs must adopt methods and strategies to deliver competent military and policing forces with individual and collective security force skill sets. Additionally, the program must address both higher-level military commands and institutions and HN governmental agencies to administer security forces competently. The foreign military training program must

⁸ Erwin Rommel, *The Rommel Papers*, ed. B. H. Liddell Hart, trans. P. Findlay (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1985) p. 226.

⁹ Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign military training (Foreign Military Training), 17 September 2006, p. III-1

further develop competent individuals and forces across the full spectrum of operational and military trade functions. Host Nation security forces require both internal and external support agencies that are fully developed and mature to accomplish enduring stability.

Second, the '4C' foreign military training model must develop *capable* security forces. Host nation security forces must be of sufficient size and effectiveness to accomplish assigned missions within the scope of integral capabilities, and be capability matched to address prospective threat ideology, capabilities, means and intent. Development must additionally consider host nation ability to sustain security forces over time. Force manning and subsequent growth is essential to ensure longevity of the security forces and their ability to deliver enduring stability. The ability to resource HN security forces within state capabilities is additionally crucial.

Third, the foreign military training program must develop *committed* host nation security forces. Host nation administrators and the forces themselves must be committed to the enduring security and survival of the state. The foreign military training program must ensure the preservation of the liberties and facilitate peaceful transitions of power. Finally, the program must develop *confident* HN security forces. The security forces must be confident in their ability to provide enduring security of their nation. They must develop legitimacy and a wide-spread belief on the part of their fellow citizens in their abilities. Additionally, it is crucial that the security forces gain the confidence of both their own government and the wider international community, as it is the community whereby the HN security forces will gain its national operational strength.




Figure 1. JCISFA 4C Model for Developing Foreign Militaries
Source: Model provided by Centre for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA, March 2007).

The JCISFA 4C model, depicted in Figure 1, is useful in analyzing the Vietnam and Iraq foreign military training case studies. It assists in solving the primary problem of this thesis, to determine how ADF joint doctrine agencies can best address the ADF doctrinal gap regarding the training of foreign militaries. The selected analysis model will identify the adopted practices from both Australian and US FMT models in achieving the principles of the ‘4C’ model as a basis for the establishment of Australian doctrine.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL CASE STUDY – VIETNAM

Under any circumstances, the relationship of advisor-to-advised is a testy and tenuous one. Here, that relationship is compounded by daily decisions with life or death consequences, and by communications problems complicated by language difficulties and different national origins.¹⁰

GEN William C. Westmoreland, Letter to Officer Advisors,
“US Advisor/Vietnamese Counterpart Relations, 1967

Frequently, a young US Army first lieutenant with 2 years service and no combat experience became the advisor to a commander twice his age who had 25 years of combat experience.¹¹

The efforts of US and Australian advisors to develop South Vietnamese forces during the period 1955 to 1975 is a case study to examine what works, what does not work, and the challenges for the advisor developing a foreign military. The elements of the Joint Centre for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) foreign military training and validation model, as introduced in Chapter Two, highlight aspects of the Vietnam advisory experience worthy of implementing into contemporary Australian foreign military training doctrine. Additionally, an analysis of the advisory lessons during the period 1955 to 1975 provides the contemporary advisor with tested practices developed in Vietnam. Finally, recommendations for development of contemporary Australian advisory doctrine based upon the analysis of US and Australian efforts to advise a foreign force in a protracted and dynamic operational environment will become apparent.

¹⁰ Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, “*Command History 1967*,” vol. 1 11 September 1968, p. 27

¹¹ Ibid, p. 33

Background

Vietnam has endured regional warfare for centuries. The conflict between the North and South Vietnam dates back to a forty-five year war in the seventeenth century. “The animosity between the people of the north and south evident during that time is common in Vietnam today.”¹² Vietnam has rarely been unified in its modern history, with only three years of unification since 1805, and then not again until 1975. The American government formally recognized the provincial central government of Bao Dai in 1950. Simultaneously, the USSR and China formally recognized the Ho Chi Minh Democratic Republican Government.¹³ The rise of Communism during the 20th century, however, raised concerns with Western states. The 1940’s Communist-inspired insurgencies in Indonesia, Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, the Philippines, and Burma threatened Western ideals and inspired the American Joint Chiefs of Staff to state that “South East Asia is a vital segment in the line of containment of communism stretching from Japan southward and around to the Indian Peninsula.”¹⁴ Vietnamese nationalists after the Second World War sought independence from French colonial rule, resulting in the 1954 Geneva Accords. “The Geneva Accords of 1954 provided that until such time as unifying elections were held, the country would be split in half at the seventeenth parallel, between the communists in the north and the American-supported noncommunists in the South.”¹⁵

¹² Martin J. Dockery, *Lost in Translation, Vietnam, A Combat Advisor’s Story*, Random House Publishing Group, 2003, p. 17

¹³ Davies and McKay, *The Men Who Persevered*, p. 2

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Dockery, *Lost in Translation, Vietnam, A Combat Advisor’s Story*, p. 18

The peace talks of 1954 resulted in a stalemate with neither the North nor the South endorsing unification. China, a historic northern enemy, but then ally of the communist North, did not favor unification, as it feared a strong and unified Vietnamese neighbor. Conversely, the American-supported South Vietnam feared a unified Communist Vietnam and so refused the opportunity for elections aimed at unification. Vietnam moved from conflicts for independence into a civil war, North against South. Australia's interests in Vietnam first surfaced in 1952 when it appointed an accredited minister for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, residing in Saigon. Australia declared its diplomatic position concerning the combatant North and South with its 1955 ratification of the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty and Protocol, lending its support to the state of South Vietnam. With the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) formed in 1955, the south boycotted the planned elections of 1956 and Australia maintained its diplomatic ties with RVN.

The 1960's were plagued with east-west ideals and threatened communist proliferation in South East Asia. It was the 1961 struggle between the Laotian factions of the American-backed right-wing forces and the Soviet Union-supported Communist Pathet Lao that was of particular international concern. Safe passage through communist-dominated regions of Laos enabled North Vietnamese forces to gain access to South Vietnam. It was the USSR's failure to deny the North this freedom of movement that increased American support to South Vietnam. In addition, China and the USSR lent significant support to Indonesia's plans for military action to control Dutch West New Guinea (West Irian). The plan for Indonesian control of West Irian occurred in 1963, much to the concern of Australia. "In 1963 the government of Robert Menzies

[Australian Prime Minister] identified Indonesia as posing the main strategic threat to Australia and its territories.”¹⁶ Finally, Indonesia strengthened their relationship with China, which grew in prominence and influence after its 1964 nuclear declaration.

Origins of the advisory efforts

Advisory support to Vietnam gained its roots when the US provided logistical support to the French in Indochina during the 1950's. The Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) of 692 advisors transferred its support from Indochina to Vietnam in 1955.¹⁷ MAAG-V assumed the role of developing the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) into a force based upon seven infantry divisions with the support and combat support units. Initial advisory and military development focused upon building a force capable of securing South Vietnam from a North Vietnam invasion along the lines of its historical routes. This assumption proved flawed when, in 1959-60, South Vietnam faced an insurgency. MAAG-V and RVNAF therefore switched from an advisory and developmental focus to building a force capable of conducting counter-insurgency operations. Despite the previous five years of expansion and training, the RVNAF was unable to deal with the developing insurgency.

America and its allies were principally concerned with the establishment of a communist stronghold in South East Asia. Momentum for Australia's commitment to advisory support of the South's security forces grew in 1962 with an information gathering tour of South Asia by an Australian Special Forces officer, Colonel Frederick P. Serong. During his tour, he visited South Vietnam and provided foreign military

¹⁶ Davies and McKay, *The Men Who Persevered*, p. 4

¹⁷ Robert D. Ramsey III, OP 18, *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador*, CSI Press Publications, 2006, p. 27

training recommendations back to Australia. “He had written to Lieutenant General Pollard, Chief of the General Staff (CGS), in February 1962 to suggest Australia should offer a small group of officers (10-15), which he would lead, to work with the US group in Vietnam.”¹⁸ Colonel Sarong and his visit to Vietnam established the groundwork for an Australian foreign military training commitment in Vietnam.

Preliminary diplomatic discussions between the US and Australia concerning what part Australian forces could provide South Vietnam problem commenced in 1961. Initial concern regarding the doctrine and techniques of differing advisor groups slowed the official request procedures. General McGarr, chief of the US MAAG-V organization wanted to scrutinize both British and Australian counter-guerilla doctrine, but additionally demanded direct command authority before official requests for advisory support were issued to Great Britain and Australia. Bureaucracy and personal agendas eventually subsided with the commencement of operations for the Australian Army Training Team – Vietnam, which occurred on 3 August 1962 under the command of Colonel Serong. “The role of AATTV was to assist in the training (not combat) of the ground forces of South Vietnam and it was not to be employed in any other role without the prior consent of the Australian Government. The CGS also told the Secretary Department of Defence “...our instructors would be using American doctrines and techniques, so as not to confuse the Vietnamese.”¹⁹ Many initial operational concepts and expectations of both MAAG and AATTV would undergo lengthy amendments during the Vietnam advisory period. Both organizations developed sound methods of operation and

¹⁸ Davies and McKay, *The Men Who Persevered*, p. 5

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 18

it is the role of this paper to identify those methods of use to the Australian foreign military advisor in the contemporary and future role.

Lessons Learned

An analysis of the advisory efforts in Vietnam using the JSIFCA 4C model
Training soldiers to Commander

The JSIFCA 4C model, as introduced in chapter two, lends significant credence to the training of individual soldiers to commanders at all levels. The RVNAF, with assistance and advice from MAAG-V, developed a seven infantry division force from 1955-60. “Prior to 1961, MAAG-V division advisory teams were authorized an infantry colonel as the division advisor, an infantry major, and two non-commissioned officers for each of the three infantry regiments – no advisors were assigned to the three infantry battalions of four companies each, and a field artillery major and three non-commissioned officers for the artillery regiment.”²⁰ The MAAG-V advisory program assigned specialist advisors down to battalion level for supported arms such as armor, artillery, and marines in 1961. The advisors’ ability to saturate a developing army down to the individual soldier level and have the subsequent ability to conduct collective progressive training at the tactical and operational level is the optimal model for developing legitimate and lasting capability. RVNAF infantry battalions, however, continued to receive no hands-on advisory support by 1961, resulting in a challenge for the advisory effort given that the company was the largest tactical force available to the RVNAF at the time.

²⁰Ramsey, *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador*, p. 32

Upon realization of the deficiency, in 1961 the US Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara authorized an increase to MAAG-V personnel strength sufficient to establish provincial and combat battalion advisors.²¹ The decision to increase the advisory saturation of ARVN was a positive incentive; however, it continued to fail in providing advisors the ability to conduct individual level training. The proposed manning for a battalion advisory team was based upon a captain to advise the battalion commander, one lieutenant to advise the company commanders, and one senior noncommissioned officer to develop the entire battalion's noncommissioned body of soldiers. Generally, however, this proposed battalion advisory manning model was never realized. Often advisors would conduct solo advisory support to battalions the entire duration of their time.²² McNamara's efforts in 1961 would therefore only serve as an "ineffective band-aid" to rectify the inability of advisors to meet individual and collective training requirements. In response to the growth of the RVNAF, the advisory effort grew from 342 personnel in 1954 to 3150 personnel by the end of 1963.

The greatest emphasis during 1963 and arguably for the remainder of the war for the advisors was not their ability to influence individual and collective training of battalions and companies, but their ability to coordinate and facilitate US combat support. This included offensive support weapons such as artillery and attack air and other combat multipliers such as casualty evacuation and re-supply. "An advisor from this period said he had three roles: a US Army officer following orders and supervising US subordinates, a member of a RVNAF unit sharing its experiences and bonding with his counterpart, and

²¹ Ibid, p. 28

²² Dockery, *Lost in Translation, Vietnam, A Combat Advisor's Story*, p. 27

a mediator interpreting and communicating between his counterpart and his US superiors.”²³

Training across all operational functions

Australian advisors under the command of MAAG-V identified the necessity to advise and establish operational practices across all operational specialties. Not only did the advisor have to identify the tactics of their South Vietnamese counterparts, but also establish how to sustain the developing force and, in time, establish practices to ensure longevity of capabilities. Trial and error often drew out lessons of ‘best practices’ as the Australian advisors found the parallel logistical framework to be the most efficient method of supplying the developing and growing South Vietnamese forces. “When requests went through Vietnamese channels, notification was also sent via the parallel link to the US advisor at provincial level. The advisor would keep track of the request and see that it was handled in a timely manner.”²⁴ Not only did the RVNAF rely totally upon the advisor for the provision of supporting fires and aviation, but additionally required the US to form the basis of provisioning and supply. The US provided the rapidly growing force with weaponry, transportation, medical assistance, and installation development. The RVNAF, however, did not have an existing method of re-supply, nor did the organization have the ability to develop a logistical program capable of supporting the rapidly growing field forces. The failure to identify logistical frameworks capable of supporting the operational force was the principal flaw of the entire

²³ Ibid, p. 35

²⁴ Davies and McKay, *The Men Who Persevered*, p. 76

development of the RVNAF. Capability longevity therefore suffered in time given the failure to focus attention toward logistical functions.

Lessons for building a force sized and effective to accomplish mission

Contributing to the advisors' dilemma was continual growth of the RVNAF to meet operational goals. This contributed to the MAAG-V problem of stretching an already thin pool of advisors over a growing ground army. At the time of proposed RVNAF growth, the advisor group did not have the ability to facilitate hands-on individual or collective training of the existing battalions. Clearly, the operational needs analysis required a larger RVNAF. The advisors' role in that proposal was to develop a growing and developing RVNAF beyond existing advisory capabilities of MAAG-V. The capability in itself was additionally a concern for the advisor group grounded upon experience gained with RVNAF units. The advisor group questioned the ability of the developing army to grow whilst maintaining operational capability.

The common perception of the military advisors in Vietnam was that building a bigger army for South Vietnam would not necessarily grow operational capability. They questioned the ability of RVNAF to maintain tactical and operational capability across all levels of command with a larger army, and also questioned their own organization's ability to contribute effectively given the current MAAG-V advisor numbers. Martin J. Dockery, author of *Lost in Translation, Vietnam, A Combat Advisor's Story*, offers that the mission given to MAAG-V was outside the organization's capabilities. He cites a lack in manning coupled with RVNAF growth as the catalysts for eventual failure of the program. "This was a noble and honorable mission, but ended badly. In time it was obvious that our expectations had exceeded our (MAAG-V) capabilities. The mission

was just not possible.”²⁵ Regardless of MAAG-V concerns, the RVNAF would grow throughout the war.

By 1963, the RVNAF grew in strength based upon nine corps, nine divisions, an airborne brigade, a Special Forces group, a marine brigade, three separate regiments, nineteen separate battalions and 86 Ranger companies. During 1962, the advisors’ role was to develop counterinsurgency capabilities for the RVNAF. Advice concerning operational tactics, the development of tactical and technical doctrine, equipment usage, logistics, and training and administration all fell within the realm of the advisor. As previously established, the authorized eight man advisory team was responsible for providing such advice throughout the division.

By 1966, US involvement in Vietnam had grown 385,000 personnel, focused primarily upon fighting North Vietnamese and VC units rather than fighting the insurgency. In contrast, the RVNAF, now accompanied by advisors down to battalion level, assumed the role of pacification. “By 1964, infantry battalion advisory team authorizations increased to five personnel – a captain senior advisor, a first lieutenant assistant advisor, and a communications and two light weapons noncommissioned officers. From 1965 to 1969, the unit field advisory team authorizations remained constant: regiment with 3 personnel, infantry battalion with 5, division with 52, and corps with 143.”²⁶ The pacification role was revolutionary for the RVNAF, and particularly when deployed to populated areas the training deficiencies became apparent, necessitating the establishment of mobile training teams.

²⁵ Dockery, *Lost in Translation, Vietnam, A Combat Advisor’s Story*, p. 25

²⁶ Ibid, p. 32

By April 1967, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program became operational. This effort greatly increased the attention of regional advisory teams by combining the efforts of the Civil Operations personnel, who were responsible for the development and pacification, with the military advisory groups now lending greater effort to developing regional force (RF) and the popular force (PF), formerly established as Civil Guard and Self Defence organizations. The combined efforts resulted in the CORDS program boasting personnel strength of 2,260.

One of the primary aims of the CORDS program was the development of the RF and PF concepts. Sufficient advisors to saturate the forces, however, continued to concern both MACV and the CORDS program hierarchy. “An early CORDS study discovered that the ratio of US advisors to RF/PF personnel was 1 to 929, but the ratio in RVNAF was 1 to 23.”²⁷ This was a significant shortfall, with an additional 2,243 advisors required to cover the development of the RF and PF company capabilities. The resulting solution was to establish additional operational and logistical mobile training teams. By late 1967, this was realized with 354 mobile training teams authorized for establishment under guidance from MACV to address the development of the old civil and self-defense guard companies. “By 30 September (1966) 132 of 144 battalions had received the (pacification) training.”²⁸

Ensuring security and survival of the state

After the 1968 Tet Offensive and the resultant virtual destruction of the VC, the role of the advisor and the RVNAF once again changed direction. The advisor program

²⁷ Ramsey III, *Advising Indigenous Forces*, p. 30

²⁸ Ibid, p. 29

now focused upon establishing end-state and US/coalition exit strategies. The advisory effort as part of this was to improve RVNAF combat capabilities and a continuation of support to the CORDS pacification efforts. The Combined Campaign Plans (CCP) developed in 1969 declared, “RVNAF must participate fully with its capabilities in all types of operations . . . to prepare for the time when it must assume the entire responsibility.”²⁹ From this period until the end of hostilities arose the combined operations concept. Coalition and RVNAF forces together with the RF/PF groups worked side by side for the remainder of the war.

Designed to increase combat power, the combined operational method aimed for coalition units to model the way for developing RVNAF units. The role of the advisor during this period was the provision of two-way advice. The advisor was the point of call to RVNAF commanders concerning US operational practices whilst maintaining an advisory link to US commanders concerned with the operational capabilities and practices of the RVNAF. In achieving this goal, the advisory effort reached its pinnacle with respect to personnel strength by 1969 with 11,596 advisors across every branch and service. The US army advisor effort in 1969 was equivalent to seven US Army divisions. The Cambodian cross border operations of 1970 indicated improved combat capabilities of the ARVN and resulted in the reduction of advisory support by 1970 with Battalion advisory teams’ withdrawal by June of that year.

Establishing confidence and recognition

The South Vietnamese military throughout the war formed under conscription by the South Vietnamese government. Unwillingness of draft-aged males to join and fight,

²⁹ Ibid, p. 30

however, plagued the government in developing the military capabilities for the initial counterinsurgency and subsequent counter-invasion and pacification roles. “Vietnamese cities were full of draft-age males, either deserters or those who were exempt for some reason or another.”³⁰ Similar to draft experiences in the United States of the same time, the wealthy and connected found loopholes to stay out of the army. This left the army with a pool of uneducated and under-privileged soldiers who lacked discipline, commitment, and leadership. The poor South Vietnamese military leadership only served to exacerbate the advisors’ problems of developing cohesive and capable operational forces. A large proportion of the military leaders were cowardly, corrupt, or politically motivated. The cultural requirement of officers to ‘save face’ often detracted from their professional military development. The inability of the advisor to develop leaders did not become apparent until the latter portions of the war. It would serve as one of the primary contributors to the fall of South Vietnam and the ability of the RVNAF to realize an autonomous operational capability.

The 1972 North Vietnamese offensive was truly a determining test with respect to the readiness of the RVNAF capability for autonomous operations. The North Vietnamese attacked on three fronts supported by tanks and artillery. Although the RVNAF were battle-tested and heavily supported by coalition air power, the RVNAF forced the North Vietnamese forces to consolidate upon limited gains, thereby providing the sense that the RVNAF were a credible force despite several leadership caveats. Interestingly, the advisors in 1972 noted the greater effectiveness of the RF/PF to that of the RVNAF. It was the enhanced training and leadership afforded by the mobile training

³⁰ Dockery, *Lost in Translation, Vietnam, A Combat Advisor’s Story*, p. 32

teams under CORDS within the RF/PF and the inability to saturate all levels of the RVNAF battalions with advisors that was credited as the reason for the success of the RF/PF.

The result of apparent success and assessments of combat capability in 1972 was the replacement of several key RVNAF leadership positions and the continuation of reducing the advisory effort. By the 1973 cease-fire agreement, the RVNAF were deemed battle tested. It was a force of 550,000 regular and 525,000 territorial soldiers. It boasted a capable air force with the largest helicopter fleet in Asia.³¹ The leadership concerns identified during the Cambodian and Laos cross border operations continued to plague the RVNAF. This was compounded by open displays of internal corruption and an unwillingness of commanders to accept change and reform. The RVNAF was not well-supported by the population. This is most certainly a derivative of a corrupt military command. The price to pay for the shortcomings of the now autonomous RVNAF would not become truly apparent until 1975. When the North attacked again in that year the RVNAF would be found unable to concentrate combat power, resulting in definitive defeat.

Lessons and procedures for development of contemporary FMT doctrine

Preparatory Training

Similar to the advisory efforts in Korea, the advisors of MAAG-V received no specialized training. They arrived in country, received a brief and generalized orientation, and were sent on advisory duty not understanding the operational capabilities, the culture, or the language of their counterparts. This was recognized early as a flaw in the

³¹ Ibid

preparation of an advisor and did not set the conditions for successful advisory operations. With the expansion of the RVNAF and the advisory effort, the MATA course was developed and institutionalized. Established at Fort Bragg under the guidance of the Special Warfare Center in February 1962, the MATA developed advisors during a four-week program. It prepared the potential advisor with geographical area of interest studies, counterinsurgency techniques and concepts, weapons, communications, and demolitions. However, cultural and language training were not part of the curriculum until later that year, when the course was modified to a six-week program aimed at addressing that shortfall.

Language and cultural appreciation would again force change upon the course with 50 percent of the entire program devoted to developing that capability. Since its establishment in 1962, the MATA course continued to evolve with several changes; however, these changes maintained the one major theme of language training as an essential part, contributing to 71 percent of the course material by 1970. It enabled the advisor to appreciate cultural aspects of Vietnam. The language instructors were expatriate Vietnamese nationals residing in the US. It enabled rapid building of rapport upon commencement of advisory operations. “In October 1967, the US Army published its first and only field manual for advisors – FM 31-73, *Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations*.”³² This publication focused primarily upon stability operations and recommendations for establishing rapport and counterpart relations.

The pinnacle of the lessons learned throughout the preparatory advisory program in Vietnam was the establishment of the Advisor School in Di An, which focused upon

³² Ramsey III, *Advising Indigenous Forces*, p. 41

training advisors bound for mobile advisory duty. The program highlighted the standard of experienced instructors. The Di An advisory school instructor pool was formed from previous mobile training team members who were on their second, third, or even fourth tour in Vietnam. They had the opportunity to learn from counterparts and from mistakes, but nonetheless had the expertise to prepare prospective advisors. The course covered all of the requisite modules for setting up the new advisor on a path for successful operations. General advisory, weapons training, tactics, and language training from provincial native speakers formed the basis of the Di An advisory course. The course supported the instruction with substantial, timely, and relevant doctrine. The RF/PF Advisors handbook targeted at the mobile advisory effort, published in 1971, offered guidance to understanding the intricacies of provincial security forces and upon cultural considerations required to build rapport and operational success. The Di An course met with great success and forms a large portion of the recommendations offered by this paper.

Understanding Culture and Language

Advisors in Vietnam quickly understood that the requirement to understand culture and language greatly outweighed the requirement to understand any other aspect of the advisory program. Language training was realized within the preparatory advisor training. However, the advisor had a lot to learn based upon the fact that “Americans and South Vietnamese lived basically in two different worlds, separated by a linguistic and cultural barrier...that was almost impossible for the advisor to breach.”³³ No amount of preparation could truly prepare the advisor for operations in Vietnam with the RVNAF.

³³ Dockery, *Lost in Translation, Vietnam, A Combat Advisor's Story*, p. 44

An acceptance of cultural differences and an understanding or appreciation of those differences was required equally by the advisor and his counterpart. Not all of the advisors or counterparts were receptive to the cultural intricacies of advisory support. Often cultural divides were too wide to effectively establish rapport and develop sound advisory practices. The preparatory training had not provisioned the advisor with a clear understanding of the Vietnamese ways. Vietnamese culture respected the 'concept of face' factor. The advisor, therefore, battled cultural differences from the norm of US military culture, and had to battle the balance of attaching blame for fault whilst maintaining an environment conducive to future advisory support.

Unity of command or effort

The concept of assigning advisors as commanders for RVNAF battalions, as used during Korea, was investigated during 1964; however, it was dismissed by General Westmoreland, citing language, increased US exposure, and hardship living conditions making the proposal unfeasible. The result of not adopting this concept led General Westmoreland to accept unity of effort rather than unity of command and he constructed coordination methods to combine operations with their South Vietnamese counterparts. "MACV and the RVNAF Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) developed annual Combined Campaign Plans (CCP) detailing the roles and tasks for both the US and RVNAF forces."³⁴ Adopting unity of effort further complicated the advisors' role. The advisors not only served to develop capability within the RVNAF, but additionally found themselves advising US operational command elements on the capabilities of the South Vietnamese forces. Again, this caused the advisor to focus attention away from the

³⁴ Ibid, p. 29

primary role of training and development. The already critical and under-resourced advisors at the battalion level struggled with this additional advisory role. Training and development of the RVNAF suffered as a result.

This chapter has identified advisory efforts of US and Australian advisors to develop RVNAF. The element of the JISFCA 4C model for developing foreign militaries is a useful tool to identify lessons applicable for foreign military advisors to draw upon. This chapter used an historical advisory perspective as a basis of developing recommendations for the development of contemporary Australian foreign military training doctrine. Additionally, an analysis of the advisory lessons learnt during the period 1955 to 1975 has provided additional opportunity to provide the recommendations for contemporary doctrine development.

CHAPTER 4

CONTEMPORARY CASE STUDY – IRAQ

“The best form of welfare for the troops is first-class training, for this saves unnecessary casualties.”

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel³⁵

Background

The current Iraq war commenced with the US-led invasion in 2003 called ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom.’ The initial catalyst for the invasion was to deny the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); however, no evidence of such WMD was found post invasion. Saddam/Al-Qaeda links, crimes against humanity, and economic security became the reasons for war in Iraq. A coalition based predominantly upon US and UK forces overthrew Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to allow the establishment of a new legitimate government based upon democratic ideals. Secular violence, insurgency, anti-Iraq sentiment, and Al-Qaeda operations within Iraq denied the rapid establishment of security.

The enduring war in Iraq has forced the commitment of a force in excess of 140,000 US soldiers, marines, sailors and airmen. As part of a stability operation, the coalition started a Foreign Internal Defense (FID) program for Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and has trained approximately 328,700 security personnel as of February 19, 2007 (see figure 2).³⁶ Successes for the foreign military training program include the January 2005 elections for an Iraqi transitional government secured by joint coalition and Iraqi Security

³⁵ Rommel, *The Rommel Papers*, p. 226.

³⁶ Report to Congress, In accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, March 2007, p. 1
http://www.defenselink.mil/home/pdf/9010_March_2007_Final_Signed.pdf (accessed, 20 May 2007)

Forces (ISF). As the ISF training effort continues, the 4C validation model offered by the Joint Centre for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) is useful for analyzing the Iraq foreign military training program.

Lessons Learned

An analysis of the advisory efforts in Iraq using the JISFCA 4C model

Developing a competent ISF

The initial function of the 4C model is to develop capable soldiers and leaders across all levels of command and specialty. The role of the military advisor in realizing this function is to build individual and collective soldier skills. Additionally, the advisor responsibilities include the development of leaders and administrators within the entire national security system. Collective training and establishment of a security system rather than disjointed components becomes a primary goal of the advisor once individual skill sets are achieved. The author deployed to Iraq in August 2005 to train and advise the Iraqi 1st Battalion of the 2nd Brigade 10th Division. As commander of Battalion Training Team One (BTT1), the author and his team learned the lessons of establishing an operational Battalion from inception to autonomous operations.

BTT1 assumed advisory responsibility of the Battalion at the basic individual soldier skill level. The objective was to develop the Battalion to be capable of autonomous operations and acceptance of provincial security responsibility within six months. This required the development of a detailed plan and required advisory support across all levels of command and specialty within the battalion. Challenges included the setting of goals for an end-state by developing a ‘what is good enough’ approach to setting standards. “The standards for the training and equipping of an indigenous force

must be developed by studying and adapting to the tactical and operational situations on the ground.”³⁷ The advisor must therefore be prepared to adapt procedures and principally be prepared to reduce initial expectations.

A fundamental flaw in foreign military training is the expectation of developing Host Nation (HN) security forces into western style militaries. Military and social culture, the operational environment, and historical training/operational methodologies often force the advisor to modify initial expectations for training. The advisor must quickly realize that all foreign militaries differ and not necessarily for the worst. Often a model of the military in which the advisor serves does not suit the operational environment, nor should it be expected to. Secondly, the HN often does not require a western military organization or structure, nor is it desirable. Finally, the author realized that his team was responsible for developing competent soldiers and leaders appropriate to the battalion tactical and operational situation. Only after this realization and the establishment of the ‘what is good enough’ mindset could BTT1 make progress in developing competent security forces.

Competency across all military functions must be a goal of the foreign military training model. An all function training focus develops sustainable capabilities such as enduring training methods and provides the basis of operational stability. BTT1 deployed with a 24-man all function training team and had the capacity to saturate not only the combat elements of the Iraqi Battalion but also the combat support functions required for protracted full spectrum operations. BTT1 ensured that attention was afforded to the operational, intelligence, logistical, and command functions of the battalion. Only after

³⁷ Colonel John R. Martin, US Army, Retired, *Training Indigenous Security Forces at the upper end of the Counterinsurgency Spectrum*, Military Review, November-December 2006, p. 59

gaining competence in all core soldiering combat skills, supported by competent functional cells, can the foreign military training model re-focus attention on the development of capable skill sets.

Developing a capable ISF

The ability of the ISF to operate without advisory assistance relies heavily upon the ability of a force to be sustainable over time. “The most significant shortcoming in both MOD and MOI forces’ capabilities is in planning and executing logistics and sustainment requirements.”³⁸ The Iraqi military has an existing, albeit archaic, method of logistics at the battalion and brigade level. The challenge presented to the foreign military trainer is to adapt methods of enhancing the existing capability. The BTT1 logistical advisor adopted several methods for developing the existing Iraqi method for sustainment. Initially, BBT1 formalized the methods through the adaptation of existing logistical methods and doctrine and then subsequently standardize the method and doctrine across the entire brigade. Iraqi logistical user handbooks and ‘best practices’ were formalized into doctrine, endorsed by the command and distributed to subordinate functional leaders. This process standardized procedures throughout the battalion and were subsequently used as the catalyst for establishing brigade and divisional logistical doctrine. Secondly, BTT1 developed procedures for parallel logistical planning to ensure accountability of coalition finances and materiel. In accordance with the recently formalized Iraqi logistical doctrine, Iraqi logisticians submitted requests for resources, pay, and projects in accordance with chain of command demands. Coincidentally, the BTT1 logistics advisor submitted requests for the same demands through coalition chain

³⁸ Report to Congress, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, March 2007

of command, thereby ensuring the establishment of procedures for enduring sustainability.

Finally, BTT1 addressed the process of individual and collective accountability. Historically, issues of equipment are poorly documented by Iraqi logisticians. An example in case is the issue of field blankets. Records proved that the 1st Battalion had taken issue of 4300 field blankets for a battalion of 890 soldiers. Each soldier is entitled to 2 blankets; however BTT1 regularly received additional requests for more as the soldiers could not present the item when preparing for protracted operations. BTT1 subsequently found that the field blanket was a sought after item in the local markets and offered the Iraqi soldier with a ready source of disposable income. Accountability and issue sheets were therefore adopted with 'one for one only' replacement adopted to alleviate the continuance of poor accountability. Self-sustainability will be of particular importance upon coalition departure.

Comparative force ratios required to conduct autonomous security operations differ greatly between IA and coalition forces. "As of February 19, 2007, approximately 328,700 forces (not including replenishments) have been trained. The actual number of present for duty soldiers is about one-half to two-thirds of the total due to scheduled leave, absence without leave, and attrition."³⁹ Graphically represented within figure 1 are the numbers of ISF trainees by trade and function.

³⁹ Ibid, p.1

| Current Number of Trained* Iraqi Security Forces | |
|---|------------------|
| Component | # Trained |
| Ministry of Interior Forces | |
| Police | ~135,000 |
| National Police | ~24,400 |
| Border Enforcement | ~28,400 |
| Dignitary Protection | ~500 |
| MOI Forensics Unit | ~4,000 |
| Total MOI | ~192,300 |
| Ministry of Defense Forces | |
| Army | ~120,000 |
| Support Forces | ~12,800 |
| Special Operations | ~1,500 |
| Air Force | ~900 |
| Navy | ~1,100 |
| Total MOD | ~136,400 |
| Total Trained ISF | ~328,700 |
| <p>* These numbers are not the same as those present for duty and do not include troops trained as individual replacements.</p> <p>Data of as February 19, 2007</p> | |

Figure 2. Numbers of Trained ISF, February 19, 2007 ⁴⁰

Source: Report to Congress, In accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, March 2007, p. 34

Lieutenant Colonel C.D. Grunow, U.S. Army, completed a twelve-month tour in Iraq as a senior advisor to an Iraqi Army armored brigade. He offers that IA security force numbers compared to that required by coalition efforts significantly differs. “It takes a 2000-man Iraqi brigade to take over an AO formally controlled by a 600-strong

⁴⁰ Report to Congress, In accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, March 2007, p. 34

U.S. battalion, and even then there is a drop in capability.”⁴¹ Grunow further offers several core reasons for this disparity, including differing work ethics, IA unit and personnel rotational procedures, and training.

Iraqi military culture differs greatly from that of the foreign military advisor from a primarily western cultural background. Similar to Arab culture in general, the Iraqi military is not excessively concerned with time and adopts a fatalistic approach to operations. Initially perceived as laziness by the advisor and often the source of much frustration, the cultural norm of adopting a reactive approach to operations rather than being proactive contributes significantly to the capability disparity. Secondly, ineffective IA rotational procedures create requirements for considerably more security force than that required by the coalition. After the disestablishment of the Iraqi security forces in 2003, units at the brigade and battalion level were raised under provincial recruitment arrangements. This provincial recruiting system fails to facilitate geographical displacement of units due to family, tribal, and economic ties associated with the parent region. Grunow offers that the lack of rotational capacity, coupled with the liberal leave policy adopted as an IA military cultural norm, has additionally reduced capability of IA by 20 to 30 percent.

Finally, the force ratio disparity affecting the IA compared to that of coalition security efforts is due to training. Western armies undergo a thorough process of pre-mission training prior to commitment to high intensity conflict, a luxury not afforded to the developing current IA. IA brigades and battalions rely heavily upon a small but experienced cadre of soldiers and commanders with the balance of personnel required to

⁴¹ Lieutenant Colonel Carl D. Grunow, US Army, *Advising Iraqis: Building the Iraqi Army*, Military Review, October 2006, p.147

conduct large scale and full spectrum operations consisting of personnel within the first twelve months of their enlistment. Advisors and trainers face the challenge of making ‘what is good enough’ assessments to expedite the transition of security responsibility. The training and operational preparation of the IA is vastly different from Western standards, but most definitely appropriate as the IA mission dictates. Western armies prepare for expeditionary operational tasks and train in accordance with that mission. The IA is developing to facilitate internal security, not to project power outside its borders

The aim of training IA security forces is to provide internal Iraqi security as the means of establishing legitimate governance. The IA is developing as a defensive not an offensive force. Therefore, what is good enough? An understanding of the size and standard required for the established mission is required. The current internal Iraq security mission of coalition forces is similar to that expected of the IA.

Lieutenant Colonel Peter Newell, US Army, supports the insights of Grunow concerning force disparity. Newell served a tour in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF2) from 2004 to 2005 as a task force commander charged with the responsibility of building the 205th Iraqi Army Battalion in Muqdadiyah. During an address at the Combat Studies Institute 2006 Military History Symposium, Newell offered that out of a 400 man Battalion, only 300 were actually providing effective service. Out of the 300, 150 worked on any given day due to liberal leave procedures. Out of that 150, an expected productivity did not exceed 6 out of 24 hours per day. Essentially, Newel offers that, out of a 400 man Battalion, an expectation of 50 soldiers to be productive at any given time is realistic.⁴²

⁴² Newell, *Building Iraqi Security Forces From the Bottom Up*, p. 608

The current coalition operational manning in Iraq is 160,200 personnel from thirty one countries.⁴³ Using the more conservative view of Grunow, whereby it takes a 2000-man Iraqi brigade to fulfill the security role of a 600-strong U.S. battalion, the amount of ISF personnel required for security operations is 534,400 personnel. According to the March 2007 report to US Congress regarding the measurement of stability and security in Iraq, the coalition had trained 328,700 members of the ISF. The capability gap concerning ISF personnel remains at 205,300.

Finally, concerning the development of capable forces, is the ability of that force to resource itself within state capabilities. This paper has previously discussed the ability of the force to deliver sustainable logistical operations over time. Resourced within state capabilities, however, refers to the ability of the state to support manpower requirements. The previously established manpower figure of 534,400 personnel required for ISF autonomous security operations is the raw figure used for analysis. In certain regards, this application of the 4C model will require time to gauge success. Current ISF recruiting strategies and data suggests that the state can continue to support a growing ISF. Retention, however, remains a concern for Iraqi defense administrators. BTT1 experienced a phenomenon commonly referred to as “ghost soldiers.” Soldiers exist within the ISF who appear solely within battalion personnel establishment documents as enlisted, but not present for duty. It is not the intent of the author to provide a definitive reason for the ‘ghost soldier’ concept; however, desertion, indefinite absence, infiltration, and death are possible causes. The ISF has not yet matured a capability of formal discharge, which creates false unit figures used for recruitment and reinforcement. In

⁴³ Iraq Coalition Troops http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm (accessed 30 May 2007).

fact, ‘ghost soldiers’ continue to appear upon monthly pay entitlements and to fill positions within units with established manning caps. The ‘ghost soldier’ concept denies the ability of units to reach full operational manning and greatly restricts the ability of the state to resource the ISF.

Developing a committed ISF

Critical to creating stability is the development of an ISF committed to the security and survival of the state. In providing that security, facilitation of a peaceful transition of power must be achievable. Figure 3 graphically represents the provincial security transition assessment as of February 2007. Figure 3 clearly demonstrates the ability of ISF to accept autonomous security responsibility and the associated self-governance within provinces. The areas identified as already under Iraqi provincial control, however, are relatively benign provinces. The transition of power is therefore less complicated than the highly volatile and contested provinces such as Anbar and Baghdad. It remains the challenge of coalition advisors to continue development of ISF within the provinces identified not yet ready or partially ready for transition. Similarly, the advisors to local governance under the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) play a crucial role in preparing provinces for Iraqi control.




Figure 3. Provincial Security Transition Assessment, February 19, 2007 ⁴⁴
Source: Report to Congress, In accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, March 2007, p. 56

Developing a confident ISF

HN population and government confidence is essential to the final and arguably most influential step of the 4C process. The foreign military advisors must achieve legitimacy with those they serve and form a security wedge between the insurgency and the vulnerable indigenous population. The ISF has made tremendous advancements in achieving this in many provincial theaters. Experience with BTT1 and the IA 1st Battalion is a testament to this. On numerous occasions, civilians sought refuge with ISF units as

⁴⁴ Report to Congress, In accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, March 2007, p. 56

perceived threats presented themselves. Similarly, moral and logistical support for the ISF within the region changed significantly for the better during the advisory period. Locals were pleased and in certain cases relieved to see IA and coalition patrols in remote and barely accessible regions. This collaboration and open sharing of intelligence between ISF and locals was later used as Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) by BTT1.

The ISF capability to provide a secure environment for the establishment of a legitimate democratic Iraqi government is essential to success. The international community, and specifically the US, has defined victory in Iraq through a set of specified strategic goals. In the short term, Iraq is to make steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces. In the medium term, Iraq is to assume the lead in defeating terrorists and providing its own security with a constitutional government in place and on its way to achieving its economic potential. Finally, in the longer term, Iraq is to be peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well-integrated into the international community and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.⁴⁵

Iraq and its security forces arguably are still operating within the short-term goals. The ISF is fighting terrorists with significant advances for taking the lead with respect to assuming responsibility for COIN operations made over the previous twelve months, (see figure 4). Although outside of this paper's scope, Iraq is failing to meet political milestones. As previously established with figure 4, the amount of ISF units taking the lead in COIN operations continues to grow however it remains significantly short of the target force. The longer-term goals are less definable and validation metrics are harder to

⁴⁵ US National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, National Security Council, Executive Summary, November 2005.

establish for them. Iraq is not and may never be peaceful, stable, united, or secure, and may never realize international community integration for partnership in the global war on terrorism.




Figure 4. ISF Lead Responsibility for COIN, February 19, 2007⁴⁶
Source: Report to Congress, In accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, March 2007, p. 70

The ISF training and advisory effort is arguably the priority for achieving a coalition exit strategy from Iraq. The JCISFA '4C' model focuses upon achieving that aim by establishing principles for developing competent, capable, committed, and

⁴⁶ Report to Congress, In accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, March 2007, p.53.

confident HN security forces. Development of capable soldiers and leaders across the entire spectrum of command and functions is the initial challenge of the advisor, which will require lengthy continuance given the disparities between coalition and ISF force capabilities. Secondly, security forces must be large enough and effective to accomplish their missions within the scope of their capabilities. Critical to enduring stability is the development of an ISF committed to the security and survival of the state. Finally, HN population, HN government, and international confidence is essential to the final and arguably most influential step of the 4C process. Throughout this paper, it has been established that the foreign military trainers and counterpart ISF have made significant advancements in developing operational capabilities. Additionally, there remains a long way to go before criteria essential to creating stability are achieved.

CHAPTER 5

CONTEMPORARY US FOREIGN MILITARY DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURAL REVIEW

“We need a greater ability to deal with guerilla forces, insurrection, and subversion ... We must be ready now to deal with any size force, including small externally supported bands of men: and we must help to train local forces to be equally effective.”⁴⁷

President John F. Kennedy, Message to Congress, 1961

This chapter will review contemporary US foreign military training doctrine, procedures for its employment, and the linkages between doctrine from the highest national levels through to user-level TTPs. It will additionally assess the applicability of US doctrine as a tool for the development of Australian foreign military training doctrine. The US foreign military training doctrinal hierarchy (figure 5) displays an effort to afford foreign military development planners and trainers with doctrine throughout the full scope of National Defence Directives, Joint, and Army specific publications. The US Department of Defense, with the release of the 2006 Military Support for Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR), provided an essential ‘whole of government’ link between joint, inter-agency, and single service military organizations concerned with stability, transition, and reconstruction within contemporary operational arenas. The directive enabled the development of what is now a comprehensive hierarchy of joint strategic and single service specific doctrine that addresses the fundamentals and procedures for the conduct of foreign military training.

⁴⁷ Joint Publication JP3-07.1 *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defence*, p. 1-1

The limiting factor to this chapter is the classification of several capstone publications within the US foreign military development doctrine hierarchy. In the interests of precluding a need to reclassify this paper, For Official Use Only (FOUO) publications will not be examined in detail. The mere fact that they exist, however, provides direction for the development of similar publications within the proposed Australian hierarchy of doctrine.




Figure 5. US Foreign Military Training Doctrine Hierarchy
 Source: Source information from United States Military Doctrine. Wire Diagram constructed by Author, 22 August 2007.

US Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations

Directive 3000.05 establishes joint responsibilities for the planning, training, and preparation of stability, transition, and reconstruction operations. Directive 3000.05 “provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop.”⁴⁸ Contained within SSTR is the policy goal of developing indigenous capabilities to secure internal governmental services, the HN economy, rule of law, and democratic institutions from de-stabilizing threats.⁴⁹ In achieving this goal, the military instrument of national power is responsible for the development of HN security institutions, to include civil and military. The successful development of HN security organizations ensures a stable environment, thereby allowing the conditions for the establishment of legitimate HN governmental institutions and subsequent transition of authority to HN agencies for reconstruction.

The second primary theme of the directive is the clear establishment of SSTR responsibilities. Whilst the Under Secretary for Defence Affairs maintains the responsibility to develop stability operational options for the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS responsibilities hold relevance to the topic of this paper. The CJCS is responsible for the development of inter-agency, joint, multinational, and private sector doctrine for the establishment of SSTR programs. The CJCS is additionally responsible for identifying co-ordination lines of communication with non-military organizations concerned with SSTR. Finally, and of paramount importance to this thesis, is the CJCS responsibility to “ensure that US Armed Forces have the training, structure, processes,

⁴⁸ United States Department of Defence, *Directive, Number 3000.05*, 28 November 2005. p, 1

⁴⁹ Ibid

and doctrine necessary to train, equip, and advise large numbers of foreign forces in a range of security sectors, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments.”⁵⁰ The Australian Defence Force released a directive similar to the US 3000.05 titled Adaptive Campaigning on 24 November 2006. It is the Australian Land Force response to the Australian Army’s Future Land Operational Concept (FLOC), Complex Warfighting.

Australian Army Complex Warfighting Paper

The 2004 Australian *Complex Warfighting* paper examines the concept of the Australian Army to meet the 21st century contemporary operational environment. The Adaptive Campaigning paper adds Land Force capability detail to the concept of a ‘whole of government’ approach to future warfare. “Adaptive Campaigning is defined as: “Actions taken by the Land Force as part of the military contribution to a Whole of Government approach to resolving conflicts.”⁵¹ The paper conceptualizes the role of the Australian military in supporting the 21st century complex operational environment; however, it fails to prescribe any tangible doctrine to do so. It does provide relevance to this paper in that foreign military development is forecast as a future responsibility of the ADF and presents a requirement to develop doctrine.

Adaptive Campaigning establishes five mutually supporting lines of operations. The paper lists the objectives of Complex Warfighting as Joint Land Combat, Population Support, Population Protection, Public Information and, of relevance to this paper,

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 8

⁵¹ The Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning, Version 4.18 Correct as at 24 November 2006, p. 2.

Indigenous Capability Building.⁵² Indigenous capability building is defined within Complex Warfighting as “actions to nurture the establishment of civilian governance, which may include local, and central government, security, police, legal, financial and administrative systems.”⁵³ There are very few differing concepts within the ‘indigenous capacity building’ line of operation for Complex Warfighting compared to those already examined within this paper. It does, however, achieve the goal of establishing the ADF intent to continue foreign military training in the future. The Complex Warfighting paper stresses that this line of operation must be approached as a long-term objective and one that the ADF will pursue over time to support regional security. It acknowledges that foreign militaries are not built short term and that national and international respect takes even longer. The Complex Warfighting paper provides a basis for establishing an Australian foreign military training doctrinal hierarchy. In support of the Complex Warfighting paper, a thorough examination of contemporary US doctrine is required to identify themes for the development of Joint and Army doctrine for the Australian Defence Force.

Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint TTP for FID

Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint TTP for FID, concerns itself with setting the framework for foreign national agencies to support SSTR. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines FID as the “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or designated organization to free and protect its

⁵² Ibid

⁵³ Ibid, p. 18

society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.”⁵⁴ FID within JP 3-07.1 refers to a civil/military, inter-agency, multiple service and branch approach to building institutions required for legitimacy and regional stability. It encompasses all of the elements of national power; however, JP 3-07.1 offers that “The most significant manifestation of these needs is likely to be economic, social, informational, or political; therefore, these needs should prescribe the principal focus of US efforts.”⁵⁵ The joint publication does, however, make the requisite linkage under the military element of national power for the provision of foreign military training.

JP 3-07.1 holds relevance to this paper as it links the military role of providing a secure environment as an enabler for the efforts of diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power support to IDAD incentives. “IDAD is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, military, and social) that respond to the needs of the society.”⁵⁶ Essential to establishing an effective IDAD supportive FID program and of relevance to this paper concerning foreign military development, is that the military must plan in concert with the other elements of national power. JP 3-07.1 offers strategic planning imperatives for consideration when integrating FID and foreign military development to support the goals of an established HN IDAD program.

⁵⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, p. 17

⁵⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication JP3-07.1 *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defence*, 30 Apr 2004, p. 1-1

⁵⁶ Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual, 3-05.202 *Special Forces Foreign Internal Defence Operations*, Feb 2007, p. 1-2

JP 3-07.1 offers five FID planning imperatives as the primary themes for consideration of this paper. Relevant to the development of Australian doctrine, three imperatives are considered worthy of further consideration. The first imperative is that the FID program must first and foremost ensure the maintenance of HN legitimacy. “If US military efforts in support of FID do anything to undermine the sovereignty or legitimacy of the HN government, then they have effectively sabotaged the FID program.”⁵⁷ The FID plan must support HN IDAD incentives and support long term strategic goals for sustainable military capability. This planning imperative dictates the enduring qualities of an effective FID program and the ability to develop a foreign security force with capabilities that are sustainable over time. FID agencies must plan for the time when HN security forces conduct autonomous operations aimed at facilitating internal and regional security. The JISFCA 4C model for developing foreign militaries supports JP 3-07.1 in making capability longevity a planning imperative for foreign military development programs. Both models advocate the essential requirement to develop self-sufficient security forces with clear understanding of the end-state to be considered before the commencement of any program. This includes the force itself and the HN national support agencies’ abilities to sustain the capability over time. Finally, in achieving enduring HN legitimacy, regional balances of power require consideration with security forces developed to meet internal defensive security objectives and not the ability to project military power to de-stabilize the region.

The second imperative is unity of effort. This planning imperative is essential to coordinate and synchronize the efforts of all government agencies applying instruments

⁵⁷ Ibid. p, III-1

of national power. “Planning must coordinate an integrated theater effort that is joint, interagency, and multinational in order to reduce inefficiencies and enhance strategy in support of FID programs.”⁵⁸ Prompt and functioning unity of effort is often the hardest of the operational imperatives to achieve. Failure to realize a functioning level of unity of effort will undermine cooperative IDAD efforts and contribute to reducing legitimacy and capability longevity.

Finally, and again supported by the JSIFCA 4C model, is the third imperative, to plan for a security force that suits the operational needs and the environment of the HN. Foreign military trainers must remain cognizant that the HN does not necessarily need or want a model based on some other nation’s security forces. The HN force must be developed as a tailor-made model considering existing HN military culture, threats, social, economic, and political requisites.⁵⁹ The imperative of tailoring security forces for the operational environment ensures legitimacy at the local, regional, national, and international level.

Development of Australian doctrine must similarly emphasize the planning imperatives contained within JP 3-07.1. It affords the prospective advisor strategic planning guidance upon which to base operational training TTPs. The advisor has the ability to construct operational goals and ‘lines of effort’ after the organization gains a comprehensive understanding of strategic goals and end-states.

The planning imperatives contained within JP 3-07.1 support the findings from both case studies examined within this thesis. Both Vietnam and Iraq military advisors failed in many examples to appreciate strategic planning imperatives. MACV failed to

⁵⁸ Ibid. p, III-2

⁵⁹ Ibid

ensure unity of effort until such time the CORDS program and development of Regional and Popular forces. MACV did, however, adopt unity of effort with South Vietnamese forces. Coalition forces and allies in Iraq have learnt from the lessons of the Vietnam advisory efforts by adopting the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) model. This has unified the efforts of interagency, multinational, and joint agencies to realize the goals of the Iraq IDAD.

Similarly, both the Vietnam and Iraq advisory programs struggled with envisioning end-states, enduring capabilities, and the requirement to tailor a force to meet the needs of the operational environment. The Vietnam advisory efforts under MACV went through numerous force re-structuring stages based upon changing missions and roles dictated to South Vietnamese forces. Similarly, the Iraq advisory effort has combated an ever-increasing ISF to meet operational roles without the parallel growth of supporting agencies to provide enduring capability. It is with respect to the planning imperative of end-state visualization and how foreign military force development must consider strategic goals that both the Vietnam and Iraq advisory efforts failed during initial planning. Vietnam failed to validate the operational capabilities of the South Vietnamese forces before re-deployment. Secondly, MACV failed to set up the RVNAF for enduring success by continuing to allow an over-reliance on US offensive support, resulting in a false sense of operational capability. The result was that the RVNAF was found disastrously wanting in the face of the 1975 invasion by North Vietnamese conventional and guerilla forces. Early US Iraqi commands similarly did not appreciate the requisite endstate required for the ISF and made the decision to disband the force and its command structures to the detriment of the developing ISF.

JP 3-07.1 introduces the ‘train the advisor’ requisite for effective FID programs. It lists training to encompass theater goals for FID, area and cultural orientation, language training, standards of conduct, relationships of FID programs to intelligence collection, coordinating relationships with other USG agencies, legal guidelines, rules of engagement (ROE), and tactical force protection training as requisites for advisors prior to assuming advisory duties. The MiTT academy located at Fort Riley under the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division forms, equips, trains, mentors, validates, deploys, and supports military transition teams deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. The Brigade additionally supports, redeploys and reintegrates Security Force Companies to both theatres.⁶⁰ As of October 2007, the transition-training centre located at Fort Riley, Kansas had trained and deployed 4504 military officers and soldiers. The training centre has the capacity to train in excess of 1400 personnel over six consecutive cycles at any one time. The Brigade facilitates the provisionary role of training guidance, to include Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG) and Task Force Phoenix in Afghanistan. The present course to train prospective advisors is based upon a 60-day standard model targeted at all ranks, branches, and services.

Advisors receive three days of cultural awareness based on the theater to which the training team will deploy. The cultural block of instruction is the first training event the teams conduct to establish a baseline understanding of the culture. The cultural immersion training includes the fundamentals and history of Islam, the role of the family, counterpart relations and rapport training, the history of Iraq and Afghanistan, appreciation of political, military, cultural, economic, and religious aspects of Iraq or

⁶⁰ 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division VIP presentation correct as at 26 October 2007

Afghanistan.⁶¹ Additionally, the training model delivers comprehensive language training and advisory specific instruction. During an opportunity to visit the center, the author gained an in depth appreciation of the mechanics of the Fort Riley MiTT academy. This visit will be useful in developing recommendations for both prospective Australian doctrine, and in developing force preparation models for future Australian foreign military advisors.

JP 3-07.1 provides the link between Joint, Interagency, and single service organizations within US departments responsible for FID. It additionally provides the base concepts for the development of single service doctrine focused upon the mechanics of providing advisory support to foreign security forces. JP 3-07.1 contents are useful in considering the requirements to develop Australian foreign military training doctrine. Establishment of links are required between higher interagency and joint organizations to provide the Australian advisor with the strategic planning imperatives as enablers for the ‘hands-on’ individual and collective training of soldiers, companies, and battalions. The final chapter to this thesis will provide recommendations to develop a similar Australian joint publication.

Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations

FM 3-07 makes the logical progression in terms of stability and support from the joint objectives contained within JP 3-07.1 SSSTR. Chapter 3 of FM 3-07 offers the advisor with single service FID doctrine. It makes clear the distinction between the indirect, direct, and combat support categories offered under FID programs. Of relevance to this paper is the application of direct support in developing HN security forces. FM 3-

⁶¹ Ibid

07, however, does little to take the fundamentals of what is offered in JP 3-07.1 and make prescriptive doctrine for the advisor. It is simply a repetitious offering of strategic planning guidance and does little to provide the advisor with sound ‘on the ground’ TTP.

Field Manual 3-05.202 Special Forces FID Operations

FM 3-05.202 again makes logical FID doctrinal progressions from the joint incentives offered within JP 3-07.1 SSTR. The military’s direct support role within FID is this paper’s primary agenda. FM 3-05.202 makes the distinction that FID is a legislatively-directed activity for SOF forces. It additionally offers that the task of developing foreign security forces within the entire FID program may, however, be best suited to conventional forces. Chapter 4 of 3-05.202 offers the advisor the fundamentals of providing direct support under the train and advise role of FID. The chapter highlights similar foreign military development objectives compared to previously discussed doctrine, and makes significant efforts to highlight the support to the HN Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) programs.

A principal theme of FM 3-05.202 is ability of advisory efforts to support the HN IDAD program. IDAD is the HN’s program to develop legitimacy by addressing the interests of the population by providing for security, stability, and the restoration of essential/emergency services. HN security forces clearly have a role within the IDAD to facilitate stability as a required condition for the diplomatic, information, and economic incentives to be developed. FID addresses the needs of security by supporting the development of legitimate and capable internal security forces. FM 3-05.202 is a valuable source for security force development planners. Although it is repetitious in restating the fundamentals of several previously discussed publications, FM 3-05.202 does

introduce the IDAD support concept and is therefore relevant to developing Australian foreign military development doctrine.

Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency

Both the US and Australian Armies have developed counterinsurgency publications. The Australian Army, however, has failed to acknowledge the HN security development to the same level of detail as that found within FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (COIN). Chapter 6 of FM 3-24 discusses the challenges of developing HN security forces in a COIN environment. It offers that effective COIN operations rely upon the ability of a HN government to develop and gain legitimacy and that a critical enabler for governmental development is a secure environment. Therefore, HN security force development is vital to realizing the HN IDAD goals and setting conditions for enduring stability. With strategic planning considerations established in JP 307.1, the COIN publication allows a narrowing of the focus to examine ‘on the ground’ TTP for advisors.

Contained within the framework of developing HN agencies, FM 3-24 offers a list of concurrent tasks for the advisor group to consider. Tasks including assess, organize, build or re-build facilities, train, equip, and advise to develop effective HN security forces. FM 3-24 additionally offers a set of characteristics or measures of performance (MOP) used by advisors to gauge readiness of HN security forces. The MOP, figure 6, displays similarities and parallels to the 4C model offered by JSIFCA. Of particular note is the inclusion and focus upon leadership development. “The effectiveness of the HN security forces directly relates to the quality of their leadership. Building effective leaders

requires a comprehensive program of officer, staff, and specialized training.”⁶² This somewhat departs from the imperatives listed within the 4C and have historically been overlooked in foreign military development programs. The advisory effort in Vietnam failed to address HN leadership development throughout the advisory effort. The leadership deficiency in the RVNAF arguably contributed as the primary source of failure against the 1975 successful North Vietnamese invasion.

Within the theme of leadership development, FM 3-24 offers the necessity to establish institutionalized leader training based upon four educational options. The options offered include one and four year military colleges, Officer Candidate Schools (OCS), and military training at civilian universities. In the interests of achieving enduring autonomous operational capability, the development of leaders is essential at all levels of foreign military training doctrine.

⁶² Ibid, p. 6-14

- **Flexible.** Forces capable of accomplishing the broad missions required by the host nation—not only to defeat insurgents or defend against outside aggression but also to increase security in all areas. This requires an effective command and organizational structure that makes sense for the host nation.
- **Proficient.**
 - Security forces capable of working effectively in close coordination with each other to suppress lawlessness and insurgency.
 - Military units tactically and technically proficient, capable of ensuring their aspect of national security and capable of integrating their operations with those of multinational partners.
 - Nonmilitary security forces competent in maintaining civil order, enforcing laws, controlling borders, securing key infrastructure (such as power plants), and detaining criminal suspects.
 - Nonmilitary security forces thoroughly trained in modern police ethos and procedures, and who understand the basics of investigation, evidence collection, and proper court and legal procedures.
- **Self-sustained.** Forces capable of managing their own equipment throughout its life cycle (procurement to disposal) and performing administrative support.
- **Well led.** Leaders at all levels who possess sound professional standards and appropriate military values, and are selected and promoted based on competence and merit.
- **Professional.**
 - Security forces that are honest, impartial, and committed to protecting and serving the entire population, operating under the rule of law, and respecting human rights.
 - Security forces that are loyal to the central government and serving national interests, recognizing their role as the people's servants and not their masters.
- **Integrated into society.** Forces that represent the host nation's major ethnic groups and are not seen as instruments of just one faction. Cultural sensitivities toward the incorporation of women must be observed, but efforts should also be made to include women in police and military organizations.

Figure 6. FM 3-24 Characteristics of Effective Host-Nation Security Forces.⁶³
Source: Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM3-24 Counterinsurgency*. Department of the Army. December 2006

FOUO Publications

As previously established, this paper will not discuss in detail the contents of several capstone publications within the US foreign military development doctrine hierarchy. The author has, however, gained the opportunity to review Special Edition Pamphlet 06-01, *Advising Foreign Forces (FOUO) Tactics Techniques and Procedures*, constructed by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) in January 2006. The publication offers the advisor with the requisite ‘on ground’ TTP and will significantly

⁶³ Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM3-24 Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, p. 6-7

contribute to the recommendations to the development of similar advisor handbooks or ‘aide memoire’ within the proposed Australian foreign military training doctrinal hierarchy.

The opportunity to review US contemporary foreign military training doctrine is invaluable to the aims of this paper. The US Department of Defense has learned from past advisory efforts and developed timely and considered doctrine to develop foreign militaries. The US Department of Defense has achieved a ‘whole of government’ doctrinal hierarchy, which contributes to the delineation of responsibilities for security force development from governmental agencies through single service and advisory team levels. The Australian Defence Force has established its ‘whole of government’ approach to indigenous capacity building with the release of the 2006 *Complex Warfighting* and *Adaptive Campaigning* papers. The *Complex Warfighting* and *Adaptive Campaigning* papers establish Australia’s commitment to continue training foreign militaries within the 21st century operational environment. This is, however, where the foreign military doctrinal commonalties between the US and Australian defense forces end, with a commensurate gap or absence of any lower level doctrine within the Australian doctrine publication listings.

An ADF doctrinal hierarchy for foreign military training is required to build upon the previously mentioned concept papers. Although the detailed recommendations and conclusions are made in chapter six of this paper, what has become glaringly apparent from this doctrinal review is that a doctrine gap exists within the ADF doctrinal hierarchy. Establishment of ADF Joint, Single Service, and team TTP foreign military

development doctrine would allow the logical progression of the concept link offered in the *Complex Warfighting* and *Adaptive Campaigning* concept papers.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

If you presume on the orderliness of government and fail to provide for the comfort of the governed, thus creating much resentment, disorder is certain to arise.⁶⁴

Li Quan to Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

This paper commenced with the principal theme of ‘forcing doctrine to match reality’. The principal aim of this paper is to bridge the foreign military training doctrine gap that exists within the Australian Defence Force doctrinal hierarchy. The gap within ADF foreign military training doctrine exists between an established concept of intent contained within the 2006 *Adaptive Campaigning* concept paper, and an absence of prescriptive Australian FMT doctrine. The concept of future capability skill sets to train and advise foreign militaries is established within the indigenous capacity development line of operation within the 2006 *Adaptive Campaigning* paper. What has however failed to be realized is the provision of establishing a comprehensive national, joint, single service and user level doctrinal hierarchy to support the proposed concept.

This paper has not only highlighted the Australian FMT doctrinal ‘gap’, but has made an additional effort to establish the requisite doctrinal requirements. Examination of the historical Vietnam and the contemporary Iraq advisory efforts, together with a review of contemporary US FMT related doctrine offers suggestions for the doctrinal content urgently required by advisors operating within the advisory role. This paper has in addition examined the FMT related doctrinal hierarchy as a basis for recommendations to make regarding the development of a similar hierarchy for Australian FMT doctrine.

⁶⁴ The Australian Army, *Adaptive Campaigning*, Version 4.18 Correct as at 24 November 2006, p. 18.

Many of the concepts offered as recommendations within this chapter will be generic. That said, modifications and adaptation is expected to be required when tailoring an advisory effort with differing cultural, military and historical considerations.

Proposed Australian FMT doctrinal hierarchy

As established in Chapter 5, the US has developed a robust and comprehensive FMT related doctrinal hierarchy. It encompasses national, joint and single service levels of directives and doctrine and has embraced the ‘whole of government’ approach to SSTR. In providing recommendations for the development of an Australian FMT doctrinal hierarchy, the utility of the US model is useful as a tool for comparison. Similar themes exist between the US Department of Defense directive 3000.05 *Military Support for Stability, Transition and Reconstruction* and the Australian Army 2006 *Adaptive Campaigning* paper. Both papers present intent to continue in the pursuits of training foreign militaries as sub-set of a ‘whole of government’ approach to resolve conflicts and allow for regional/international stability. As previously established however that is where the commonalities of comparison between the US and Australian FMT related doctrine cease. Based upon the findings within chapter 5 which reviewed contemporary US FMT related doctrine, Figure 7 presents a recommended doctrinal hierarchy for the development of an Australian set of publications aimed at forcing FMT doctrine to match reality.

A FMT doctrinal gap exists between the intent to develop indigenous capacity offered within *Adaptive Campaigning* and the provision of endorsed Australian doctrine to meet the task. Similar to the US doctrinal model, Australia requires the development of doctrine that supports the concept afforded in *Adaptive Campaigning* to encompass joint

and army level publications. As the legend for figure 7 illustrates, the vast majority of the Australian publications already endorsed and within circulation require supplementation to include FMT as a progression of the indigenous capacity building line of effort contained within Adaptive Campaigning. The capstone publications that with subsequently allow the development of FMT specific doctrinal guidance include ADDP 3.8 *Peace Operations* and LWD – 1 *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*. The supplementation of indigenous capacity building themes offered as concept within Adaptive Campaigning and the sub-task of FMT to support the line of effort would avail the opportunity to make the doctrinal progression to single service specific doctrine for planners and advisor tasked with the role of FMT. This void in doctrine is the principal goal of this paper and without the higher level doctrinal ‘hooks’ provided within national and joint publications the user does not gain strategic national planning fundamentals associated with the provision of advisory effort to foreign security forces.

In assuming the recommendation to establish a FMT theme is accepted within national and joint capstone operational publications, the subsequent recommendation is to develop single service doctrine linked with the task of FMT. Similar to the doctrinal tasks prescribed for ADDP 3.8 and LWD – 1, it is recommended that Army doctrine develop amendments to continue the FMT theme offered by higher level publications. As illustrated within figure 7, the base publications exist, however void of FMT related chapters. The primary goal of amendments to Australian Army single service doctrine is to provide the progressive link between national and joint FMT intent and allow the development of publications relevant to the advisor conducting the role of FMT under the indigenous capacity building line of effort. Once again, figure 7 offers the authors

recommendations for the development of an advisor ‘aide memoire’ along similar content and themes of the US Special Edition Pamphlet 06-01 *Advising Foreign Forces (FOUO) Tactics Techniques and Procedures*. This paper however will not discuss the contents of 06-01 for security reasons however it is the intent of this paper to offer recommendations for the content of an Australian advisor ‘aide memoire’ as this is the only publication requiring full development as illustrated by figure 7. The recommendations made within this paper for development of an Australian advisor aide memoire are a result of the findings from the two case studies examined within this paper, the authors experience training an Iraqi Battalion in 2005-06, and the themes offered within un-classified US contemporary FMT related doctrine.




Figure 7. Proposed Australian FMT Doctrinal Hierarchy
 Source: Australian Doctrinal Hierarchy correct as at September 2007.

Advisor 'aide memoire'

It is recommended that the development of an advisor 'aide memoire' be raised by Commandant of the Australian Combined Arms Training Centre (CATC), as a matter of urgent doctrinal effort. The agencies responsible for its construction must initially fall upon the Australian Centre for Army Lessons (CAL), and the Combined Arms Doctrine Development Section (CADDs). Secondly, it is recommended that both the combined arms and supporting arms of the Australian Army be afforded the opportunity to have input to the publication. Input from the varied corps and specialties would be best achieved through the provision of a comments circulation regarding the publication during draft iterations. Finally with regards to the 'aide memoire' publication, this paper will make recommendations for its general content. The recommendations are made as a result of examining the historical and contemporary case studies within this paper, and the opportunity afforded to the author to revise contemporary US Foreign Military Training (FMT) related doctrine.

The purpose of the 'aide memoire' is to act as a functional set of principles for individual soldiers, units and planners preparing or conducting foreign military training. It must establish a set of considered and tested Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP), with generic FMT fundamentals established applicable to any advisory program regardless of language, culture, geography, society and military, whilst maintaining the flexibility to adaptation when required. Generic FMT doctrine provides the advisor with the generalized fundamentals required for success in an advisory role regardless of the operational environment. Generic FMT doctrine must remain applicable regardless of language, culture, geography, society and military culture. Secondly, the publication must

be developed with the ability to adapt to differing operational environments and tailored to suit the advisory situation with augmentation of country targeted information and considerations. The development of the Australian advisor 'aide memoire' is recommended under the four primary themes of advisor goals/endstates, relationships/culture and language, training fundamentals and leadership/cadre development. The recommendation for content of the 'aide memoire' is offered as a result of this papers examination of two advisor case studies and the revision of US contemporary FMT related doctrine.

Generic 'aide memoire' doctrine

First and arguably foremost, the advisor must understand the goals of advisory assistance. The advisor must at the outset understand Australia's goal for providing a foreign military advisory assistance. The ultimate national goal is to provide regional and international stability by enabling HN security forces the ability to self secure from lawlessness and subversion. The November 2006 Australian Adaptive Campaigning paper offers five lines of effort to resolve conflicts in the 21st century. As previously discussed in Chapter 5, the line of effort pertinent to the provision of advisory assistance is building indigenous capacity. Adaptive campaigning offers that the goal of Indigenous Capacity Building is to "...nurture the establishment of civilian governance, which may include local and central government, security, police, legal, financial and administrative systems."⁶⁵ In understanding Australia's and the HN goals for FMT advisory assistance, the advisor and planners are able to establish models for training focused upon considered endstate conditions to be met.

⁶⁵ The Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning, Version 4.18 Correct as at 24 November 2006, p. 4.

The proposed advisory 'aide memoire' must afford the advisor with endstate considerations. As a result of examination of the Vietnam and Iraq advisory case studies conducted within this paper, endstate conditions are often overlooked or poorly considered. The Vietnam advisory efforts did not fully appreciate endstate conditions for enduring RVNAF capability principally through its over-reliance and provision of US offensive support assets. This instilled a counter-productive and false sense of security within South Vietnamese counterparts with the ramifications not truly becoming apparent until the successful North Vietnamese invasion of 1975. Similarly, initial planners concerned with the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) development did not appreciate endstate conditions and created a development challenge that continues to plague advisors with the entire disbandment of the former Iraqi Army. Endstate may take various forms for the advisor. It is therefore recommended that the proposed Australian FMT doctrine avail the advisor with a broad range of endstate considerations to include, operational capability, integration with other agencies, equipment, facilities and enduring training standards.

Doctrine regarding the expansion of advisory relationships additionally belongs within the advisor 'aide memoire'. Failure to establish personal counterpart relationships has proven to significantly degrade the expectations for success of an advisory program. Both the Vietnam and Iraq advisory efforts advocated the necessity to establish relationships with commanders of coalition forces operating within the zone of responsibility. This relationship is essential when establishing unity of effort or command between the coalition security forces and the developing HN security forces. The advisors role must therefore extend beyond that of a foreign military trainer. The advisor must facilitate the critical function of liaison between the HN forces and coalition commands.

Effective co-operative operations between the HN security forces and the coalition create conditions conducive to operational success and greatly increase the opportunities for longevity of HN security capabilities. Considerations regarding the principal of expanding advisory linked relationship have dictated recent change to the Iraq advisory model. Commanders of advisory teams are now considered subordinate commanders of Brigade Combat Team (BCT) commanders. As discussed within Chapter 4, the advisor is now considered as liaison officer between the BCT commander and the ISF battalions, thereby becoming sub-units of the BCT in co-operative operational efforts. This ensures the expansion of HN security capabilities as a mentorship role is provided by the BCT whilst the advisor maintains as the expert for Iraqi operational techniques for the BCT commander whilst advising Iraqis on US or coalition operational procedures.

Of similar significance is the advisors requirement to build rapport with HN counterparts. Failure to develop effective HN relationships will reduce the advisor to a liaison role. Cultural aspects of the HN require consideration for effective rapport building. Both the Vietnam and Iraq case studies support the significance of establishing doctrine concerned with culture, language and building rapport. Vietnam advisors immediately realized the value of understanding culture and language. The Vietnam advisory program established this informational imperative as part of the package delivered within the preparatory advisor training. Similarly, Iraq advisors now receive three days of cultural awareness based on the theatre for deployment. The MiTT centre established at Fort Riley follows this with a cultural immersion package which includes the fundamentals and history of Islam, the role of the family, counter part relations and rapport training, the history of Iraq and Afghanistan, appreciation of political, military,

cultural, economical and religious aspects of Iraq or Afghanistan.⁶⁶ Development of doctrine concerned with cultural immersion attributes to preparing advisors to establish rapport with HN counterparts.

The third primary theme recommended for the development of a formalized Australian advisor 'aide memoire' is training fundamentals. The 'aide memoire' must make provisions and considerations for the advisor concerning individual and collective training standards. The advisor must prepare to receive the HN security force in varied stages of development ranging from the forming of a unit through to operational autonomy. The advisor must therefore be prepared with the aid of doctrine to consider the models for training, assessment of training standards and providing for an enduring training methodology for the force post advisory assistance. The 'aide memoire' has the ability to prescribe advisor training fundamentals through the inclusion of captured lessons learned for both flawed and successful training approaches, and the addition of several vignettes from historical and contemporary training models. This paper has achieved the provision of several key lessons learned from the Vietnam and Iraq training models. It is therefore recommended that Chapters 3 and 4 be used as the basis for constructing this theme within the 'aide memoire' in consultation with the Australian CAL and US Centre for Army Lessons Learned (CALL).

The fourth theme recommended for inclusion within the 'aide memoire' is focused upon leadership and HN 'cadre' development. As highlighted within Chapter 3 of this paper, this area is often overlooked or flawed when constructing FMT programs. The advisory efforts in Vietnam failed to sufficiently develop leaders within the RVNAF

⁶⁶ 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division VIP presentation correct as at 26 October 2007

resulting in significant operational deficiencies. Military and societal culture often dictate the appointment of leaders within HN security forces, however advisers must remain cognizant that it is within the advisory role to ensure accountable leaders are developed within HN security forces. Chapters 3 and 4 of this paper highlighted several challenges for the advisor when developing leaders of HN security forces. Often the role of the leader, as dictated by HN military culture inhibits the development of leaders. The advisor must be prepared to offer leadership alternatives to the HN force by introducing the role of HN cadres, company and battalion training cells and Officer/NCO leadership development packages. The proposed 'aide memoire' must therefore make provision for the advisor to instigate leadership development themes as part of the overall advisory effort.

Training advisors pre-deployment

Preparation of the advisor is paramount the establishment of successful advisory efforts. The US has embraced this ideal through the establishment of the advisor preparation centre at Fort Riley facilitated by 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division. Figure 8 offers the 60 day advisor preparation program which is based upon the fundamentals offered within US contemporary FMT related doctrine. The author visited the centre in October 2007 to gain an invaluable insight to the mechanics of the program and establish links to the base of instructors preparing advisors for the Iraq and Afghanistan theatres of operation. Based upon the authors experience in preparing his advisory team for advisor duties in Iraq 2005-06, the ADF has failed to establish a formal advisor preparation course. The advisory effort currently offered by the ADF does not warrant the establishment of a similar centre to that of Fort Riley, however the basis of

the 60 day model used by 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division does offer a base model for training preparation. With modifications, the 60 day program offered at figure 8 is highly applicable to the recommendations made within this paper.




Figure 8. Fort Riley 60 Day Advisor Preparation Program.
 Source: 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. VIP presentation MiTT Training Academy. Correct as at 26 October 2007

Publishing Recommendations

Rectification of the FMT doctrinal gap exposed within this paper will require significant doctrinal effort. In order to resolve the problem of forcing doctrine to match reality, an audience for this paper within the ADF is require promoting discussion and endorsement of the recommendations. The Land Warfare Studies Centre publishes a series of ‘working paper’ which promotes a wider understanding of land warfare and facilitates research into use of the Australian Army land power. It facilitates professional debate within Land Force Army and is often used as a tool to gain General Officer audience to operational opinion. The Land Warfare Studies Centre offers that, “working papers produced by the Land Warfare Studies Centre are vehicles for initiating, encouraging or nurturing professional discussion and debate concerning the application of land warfare concepts and capabilities to the security of Australia and its interests.”⁶⁷ In the interests of addressing the recommendations to this paper, the author intends to pursue publication within the Land Warfare Studies Centre working paper series. The authors aim in doing so is to elicit debate within the Australian Land Force and attempt to close the FMT doctrinal gap and force it to match the reality of Australian contemporary operational tasks.

In ‘forcing doctrine to match reality’, this paper has provided recommendations to bridge the FMT doctrine gap that exists within the Australian Defence Force doctrinal hierarchy. The 2006 *Adaptive Campaigning* concept paper highlights Australia’s intent to continue the operational line of effort to develop indigenous capacity. It has however failed to offer the continuance of prescriptive Australian FMT doctrine to match intent.

⁶⁷ Land Warfare Studies Centre, Working Paper Series, ISSN 1441-0389, July 1997

This paper has therefore offered recommendations for the development of comprehensive national, joint, single service and user level doctrinal hierarchy to support the proposed concept. Through the examination of the historical Vietnam and the contemporary Iraq advisory efforts, together with a review of contemporary US FMT related doctrine this paper has made recommendations for doctrinal content urgently required by advisors operating within the advisory role.

Figure 7 offers the proposed current Australian doctrine requiring FMT amendments, and the basis for establishment of a new advisor 'aide memoire'. It has additionally offered the four primary advisor doctrine themes of goals/endstates, relationships/culture and language, training fundamentals and leadership/cadre development as a result of the findings highlighted by the Vietnam and Iraq case studies together with the review of US contemporary FMT related doctrine. This paper has made the additional branch to offer recommendations for preparing Australian advisors in the role of FMT. Preparation using formalized doctrine as the basis for instructional content will provide the advisor with FMT fundamentals and considerations for establishing effective training models. Much work remains to match Australian FMT doctrine with the reality of intent for future operations. This paper however will serve as the tool to promote professional discussion and effort to rectify the doctrine gap and provide the advisor with the requisite doctrine and procedures for FMT employment.

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